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Introduction     
talking trouble 
 
Ereignis, thought’s final word, does not, perhaps, put into play anything but the play of the idiom 
of desire. 
---Maurice Blanchot 
 
 
Insofar as human beings try to “know” we must define concepts, objects, actions. 
We label, we distinguish between one concept and another, and in doing this, we make 
categories. Labels are categories.  
Our categories are imperfect. Our labels are always relative, defined by and 
dependent on that which they exclude. The boundaries of our terms, what “counts” as 
something or what is considered to be within a certain term, are always shifting. Our 
definitions change based on our method of analysis. For instance, the definition of “human” 
is different in different disciplines, like science, philosophy, sociology, economics, etc. Given 
their instability, categories can only be rough approximations of what we mean, and not 
always very good ones at that. To our detriment, we sometimes forget that they are 
approximations, and already laden with meaning of their own. Michel Foucault and other 
thinkers have pointed out that some of our ways of knowing, for example, the scientific 
method, have become synonymous with truth, objectivity or neutrality. When this happens, 
we cease to question those ways of knowing, and the questions within those ways of 
knowing. We forget that the kinds of questions we ask determine the kinds of answers we 
find. Then, when something that does not prove easily “knowable” or categorizable 
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troubles our ways of knowing, we call it trouble. Instead of remembering that our methods 
are imperfect, we think that the thing we want to know about is flawed, wrong or bad. 
This thesis is a reclamation of the flawed, the failed, the queer, a revaluation of it as 
something positive and productive. It is a reminder to be critical of our categories, and to 
rule them rather than be ruled by them. Categories are tools, not truth.  
In this thesis I use Bartleby the Scrivener to enter into a discussion on inequality 
imposed by and maintained through categories. I attempt to write a rough guide towards 
“equality” or that vague, unformulated state outside of categories. The specific system of 
categories on which I focus is the gender binary. 
As a feminist, the issues of “gender equality” and sexism are important to me. 
While many feminists and non-feminists think of feminism as a movement for women’s 
rights, or gender equality, I consider it to be “a movement to end sexism, sexist 
exploitation and oppression” (hooks 1). If sexism is gender essentialism, the belief that 
knowing someone’s gender tells us anything definitive about the person, then feminism is 
fundamentally a movement against gender hegemony, against the idea that gender 
categories reveal anything useful about individuals within the categories. Gender inequality 
is a symptom of the gender binary that by nature of defining the terms within the binary, 
perpetuates harmful stereotypes about each gender. Thus, the hard and fast binary itself is 
the root problem.  
I believe that feminist inquiry must be dedicated to questioning the very gender 
categories that some feminists hold to be the primary motivation of the movement: 
“woman”. I have found that teasing out the instances of our gender failures, the moments 
when we “break gender stereotypes”, does much to destabalize the gender binary. In this 
thesis, I examine the potential for social change away from gender hegemony, through a 
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revaluation of individuals who continuously destabalize the binary. These people who 
trouble the categories of gender and queer the binary call themselves genderqueer. They 
do not see themselves neatly fitting into either category “man” or “woman”. By rejecting 
the claim that individuals who do not fit are mistaken and wrong, we can remember that 
the categories we begin with are what are mistaken and wrong.  
Even in writing this thesis I have had to confront the inadequacy of words to convey 
my true meaning. Indeed, this project is a clumsy attempt to reason through the 
uncategorizable. In doing this, like anyone who endeavors to expresses through language, I 
rely on categories. I would like to use this moment as an opportunity to clarify (or perhaps 
obscure) some of the terms I use in this thesis. 
Secondary humanity, laws, order and categories are terms that I have tended to use 
more or less interchangeably throughout my thesis. Secondary humanity refers to the 
people who have parsed the world into categories to make order and sense of that 
world, and who live according to those rules. As I have previously explained, these 
categories are not neutral or natural and neither is the order imposed by them. The 
paternal function is a closely related term that denotes the institutionalized imperative of 
those in the most valued group to rule, “protect” and provide for those in any less valued 
groups. 
I also want to note that by arguing for the deconstruction of gender categories, I am 
not calling for equality through “gender-blindness.” I believe that we must become critically 
gender-conscious in order to expunge the (hetero)sexism that permeates our lives and 
begin to move towards something of a society of equals. 
This thought leads to another point— when I write of Deleuze’s society of equals, I 
do not mean an equality of sameness, wherein every human is considered fundamentally 
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similar. It is highly contentious whether or not all humans are fundamentally similar, 
especially when we reclaim our margins (the “disabled”, the “queer”, the “mentally 
retarded” etc.) Regardless, many critically conscious writers and activists have observed that 
the categories we use to mark certain differences arise in effort to pathologize certain 
groups of people, and inevitably result in the groups’ dehumanization and 
disenfranchisement. Deleuze is concerned with an equality, not of difference, (for difference 
relies on the categories that we attempt to overcome in this thesis) but of elimination, 
elimination of sameness and difference, elimination of inequality and so too equality. He 
would have hegemonic categories be abandoned in favor of “even more obscure and 
ambiguous forces. The subject loses its texture in favor of an infinitely proliferating 
patchwork… devoid of center, of an upside down or right side up” (77). 
At this point I would also like to make a note on methods. In this thesis, I explore 
two stories, Bartleby the Scrivener by Herman Melville, and Loving Outside Simple Lines by 
Sonya Bolus. I chose to ground my analysis in stories because they offer an emotional 
concreteness that theory alone does not. If the central insight of this thesis is that we must 
forever question our categories, then we must be skeptical of theory. Theory is general. 
Stories are particular. In some ways, these stories fit the theories I apply to them, but in 
wonderful ways, they are also a little messy. They defy neat categorization, and in doing so, 
provide their own defense mechanism against the theory within this thesis. 
This thesis would not have developed as it did, had I not been experiencing my 
own version of the story I was telling, at the same time. As much projection of personal 
experience as literary analysis went into interpreting the Bartleby and Loving. Perhaps this 
thesis is more a theoretical explanation of my own journey, my particulars, than the 
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broader paradigm for social change that I set out to write. But maybe there is room for it 
to be a bit of both.
 Bartleby 
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1
1 
Bartleby 
as a paradigm for resistance 
 
 
 
 
 
“To revolt outright is to affirm its authority…better to…undermine from within, gently erode, 
recognize discrepancies, play with roles, the language and the symbols, and let the play itself rob 
them of their terrifying power.” 
---Carol LeMasters 
 
 
The attorney in Bartleby the Scrivener represents a part within each of us. He is the 
well-meaning, well-adjusted, average guy. With respect to Bartleby, the attorney comes 
from a place of privilege, a favored son of the system. As such, he also stands for normative 
power relations, for the part of us that conforms to hegemonic ways of thinking, and serves 
“the man.” Standing in stark contrast, Bartleby provides a radical critique. His ability to 
“reveal [the world’s] emptiness, the imperfection of its laws, the mediocrity of its particular 
creatures… the world as a masquerade” is a kind of queering function that calls order into 
question (Deleuze 83). The nature of Bartleby’s critique and the consequent potential for 
social change are the focus of this chapter. 
I will begin by summarizing Bartleby the Scrivener, and then I will explain the 
arguments and interpretations of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze and 
Maurice Blanchot. Hardt and Negri introduce us to Bartleby’s revolutionary prospects, while 
Deleuze and Blanchot clarify the nature of Bartleby’s particular brand of subversion and 
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provide an argument in favor of Bartleby’s brand of resistance. In my examination of 
Bartleby the Scrivener, I borrow heavily from Deleuze to develop a model for resistance to 
hegemonic systems of meaning. This model consists of an “Original” who critiques the 
normative system, and a “Prophet” who is, at least initially, subservient to that system, and 
who stands to interpret the critique of the Original. In the following chapters I will apply 
this model to the hegemonic gender binary, to demonstrate how it may be applied 
practically.  
 
Herman Melvi l le ;  Bart leby the Scr ivener   
The story is narrated by an attorney who works primarily on “rich men's bonds and 
mortgages and title-deeds” (Melville 2). The attorney has two copyists working in his office, 
Turkey and Nippers. Turkey is self-controlled and productive in the morning, but altogether 
too energetic in the afternoon to do anything of consequence. On the other hand, Nippers 
is productive in the afternoon, only after his indigestion subsides. “Their fits relieved each 
other like guards. When Nippers' was on, Turkey's was off, and vice versa” (Melville 6). In 
their extreme particularities, both characters provide a foil for Bartleby, a character who is 
typified by his nonparticularity. The last character in the office is Ginger Nut, whose sole 
purpose is to get ginger nuts for Nippers and Turkey. 
Having received the office of Master in Chancery, the attorney decides to put out 
an advertisement for another copyist to help with the increased workload. Soon, Bartleby 
appears at his door, and the attorney hires him after asking only a few questions about his 
qualifications. At first Bartleby copies endlessly, as if he were more machine than human. 
On the third day, the attorney calls Bartleby into his office to verify the accuracy of a paper. 
“Bartleby in a singularly mild, firm voice, replied, ‘I would prefer not to’” (Melville 8). The 
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attorney is surprised, but decides to deal with the situation later. He calls Nippers in to help 
him instead. 
On the next occasion, the attorney asks Bartleby to join all of them to review a 
paper. When Bartleby responds in his usual refrain, the attorney is once again “strangely 
disarmed… but in a wonderful manner touched and disconcerted...” (Melville 10). The 
attorney tries to reason with Bartleby this time, yet Bartleby continues to respond that he 
prefers not to. Once again, the attorney decides to postpone dealing with Bartleby’s 
impudence, deeming it “passive resistance”, rather than outright rebellion (Melville 12). He 
says “Poor fellow! thought I, he means no mischief; it is plain he intends no insolence; his 
aspect sufficiently evinces that his eccentricities are involuntary” (Melville 12). Meanwhile, 
Bartleby’s word “prefer” begins to make its way into the attorney’s vocabulary. 
 When this happens a third time, the attorney admits that he “burned to be rebelled 
against” (Melville 13). He decides to try to get Bartleby to directly refuse an order. The 
attorney asks Bartleby to go to the post office. “I would prefer not to.”/ “You will not?”/ “I 
prefer not” (Melville 13). Then the attorney asks him to fetch Nippers for him. Once again 
Bartleby “prefers not to.”  
Initially the attorney is roiled by his interactions with Bartleby. He becomes 
distraught and plans retribution. However, as time goes on, the attorney becomes more 
reconciled to the situation. Everyone in the office comes to understand that Bartleby 
copies, but is permanently excused from all other duties. Though the attorney continues to 
ask things of Bartleby intermittently, now when Bartleby answers that he prefers not to, 
“every added repulse of this sort which I received only tended to lessen the probability of 
my repeating the inadvertence” (Melville 15). 
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One Sunday, the attorney is near the office and decides to go in. There he finds 
Bartleby, who asks him to come back later. When the attorney returns, he finds the office 
empty. Rooting through Bartleby’s things, the attorney discovers that Bartleby has been 
living in the office. At first the attorney is overcome with pity for Bartleby, and in a sense, 
for himself. Then, fear and repulsion replace his melancholy. The attorney resolves to ask 
Bartleby some questions the next day, and to let Bartleby go if he does not answer them. 
 Though Bartleby declines to answer the attorney’s questions, the attorney does not 
fire Bartleby as he had intended to. Instead, the attorney asks Bartleby “to comply as far as 
may be with the usages of this office. Say now you will help to examine papers tomorrow 
or the next day: in short, say now that in a day or two you will begin to be a little 
reasonable” (Melville 20). As expected, Bartleby replies that he would prefer not to be a 
little reasonable. Meanwhile, Nippers, Turkey and the attorney use the word “prefer” more 
and more frequently.  
The next day, Bartleby ceases even to copy. “Bartleby did nothing but stand at his 
window in his dead-wall reverie. Upon asking him why he did not write, he said that he had 
decided upon doing no more writing” (Melville 21). 
After a time, the attorney decides to fire Bartleby. He gives Bartleby six days notice. 
Of course, by the end of the six days, Bartleby has not moved. The attorney gives Bartleby 
thirty-two dollars and bids him farewell. The next day, the attorney comes back to the 
office to find Bartleby still in his corner. After extensive pondering, the attorney comes 
again to accept the arrangement with Bartleby, that Bartleby stand idly in the office-room, 
“noiseless as any of these old chairs” (Melville 27). Before long, the attorney’s peers begin 
to talk, which makes the attorney uneasy. After entreating Bartleby once more to leave, the 
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attorney thinks to himself, “Since he will not quit me, I must quit him” (Melville 29). Shortly 
thereafter, the attorney moves his office to another part of the city.  
Just when the attorney thinks he is through with Bartleby, the new occupant of his 
former office seeks him out to ask about Bartleby. The attorney denies any responsibility 
for Bartleby. Several days later, the lawyer returns with others who beg the attorney to 
help get rid of Bartleby. Eventually, the attorney agrees to speak privately with Bartleby. 
During this conversation the attorney offers to house Bartleby, but remains unsuccessful in 
his attempt to animate Bartleby’s preference. At last, the police arrest Bartleby and take 
him to the Tombs, a jail. The attorney visits Bartleby twice in the jail. The first time, the 
attorney buys Bartleby a meal, though Bartleby declines. The second time, he finds Bartleby 
dead. The attorney’s final words on Bartleby are, “Ah, Bartleby! Ah, Humanity!” (Melville 
37). 
 
Hardt and Negri ;  Absolute Resistance 
I introduce Hardt and Negri’s interpretation of Bartleby first, since their aim is 
essentially similar to my own in assessing Bartleby as a potential agent for social change. 
They hold that Bartleby successfully enacts “the absoluteness of the refusal,” but still falls 
short of their prescription for revolution because he fails to envision the new order (Hardt 
and Negri 203).  
It is Bartleby’s signature phrase “I would prefer not to” that Hardt and Negri deem 
the absolute refusal. “He does not object to this or that task, nor does he offer any reason 
for his refusal—he just passively and absolutely declines” (Hardt and Negri 203). Bartleby 
“prefers not to” do any of the tasks requested of him by the attorney, thus it is impossible 
for the attorney to prompt Bartleby into action by words alone. For example, the phrase “I 
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would prefer not to” could neatly follow nearly any formulation of a mandate, such as 
“please do it”, “I want you to do it”, “you must do it”, or even “Do it or else.” Because 
Hardt and Negri see Bartleby as enacting the “absolute refusal”, they infer that Bartleby 
hates authority, and therefore find his actions pertinent to a discussion of the overthrow of 
such authority. They write, “The refusal of work and authority, or really the refusal of 
voluntary servitude, is the beginning of liberatory politics” (Hardt and Negri 204). Hardt 
and Negri name their method of revolutionary action in quoting Etienne de La Boetie, 
“Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands 
upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no longer” (qtd. in 
Hardt and Negri 204). Rather than a coup d’etat, Hardt and Negri envision a boycott 
d’etat. If we take this as the paradigm of resistance and rebellion, there is no doubt that 
Bartleby is useful to the discussion. However, for Hardt and Negri, the disavowal of 
authority marks only the beginning of liberatory politics. “Beyond the simple refusal, or as 
part of that refusal, we need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new 
community” (Hardt and Negri 204). Because they do not see how Bartleby offers a new 
mode of life or a new community, they deem the Bartlebian method unfinished and failed. 
Bartleby’s path is all too solitary, leaving him to “continuously tread on the verge of suicide” 
(Hardt and Negri 204). “In political terms, too, refusal in itself (of work, authority, and 
voluntary servitude) leads only to a kind of social suicide” (Hardt and Negri 204). More is 
required-- a new society must be envisioned as a necessary form of rebirth. 
There are several aspects of Hardt and Negri’s argument I take issue with—namely, 
the “refusal”, the supposedly inherent solitude of Bartleby’s resistance, and Bartleby’s failure 
as an agent for social change. 
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Though I agree with Hardt and Negri that Bartleby’s resistance is absolute, and will 
go into more detail about this shortly, I think they make a mistake in calling Bartleby’s 
absolute resistance a refusal, an act of outright rebellion. The attorney himself tells us that 
Bartleby “means no mischief; it is plain he intends no insolence; his aspect sufficiently 
evinces that his eccentricities are involuntary” (Melville 12). The aspect that the attorney 
refers to is Bartleby’s ever solemn, polite demeanor. Such a demeanor would be 
incompatible with a physical struggle, necessary to constitute a full refusal. For example, at 
the end of the story, Bartleby is taken away to the Tombs and “offered not the slightest 
obstacle, but in his pale unmoving way, silently acquiesced” (Melville 33). Though we may 
well assume that Bartleby preferred not to go, it is clear that he did not refuse to go, for he 
did not resist in any way his physical removal. Indeed, Bartleby does not intend to be 
rebellious, and his preference not to should not be taken as a refusal but rather precisely 
what the attorney names it to be—a passive resistance. Furthermore, a refusal would 
indicate that Bartleby to some degree acknowledges the authority of the attorney and the 
system in which they live. This, above all, Bartleby does not do. 
I think careful consideration of the implied preference that Bartleby’s idiosyncratic 
phrase addresses would provide us with a deeper understanding of the nature of his 
resistance. Within a much larger argument, Hardt and Negri offer only a two-page 
discussion of Bartleby, in the course of which they do not treat this question. Yet reflection 
here may illuminate the subtle difference between hating authority, and failing to recognize 
it, refusing and resisting. So to what does Bartleby’s preference “not to” ultimately refer? I 
think the versatility of Bartleby’s phrase in paralyzing all forms of speech commands reveals 
that the attorney’s requests and even his demands are predicated on the notion that 
Bartleby preferred to serve, preferred to appease. The attorney falsely assumes that 
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Bartleby cares about authority. For example, if the attorney knew that Bartleby had no 
regard or respect for authority or what one “should” do, he would have never tried to 
impose his will on Bartleby with words. He would have used physical force from the 
beginning. Neither would the attorney have appealed to reason in order to convince 
Bartleby, as he does when he demands the reason for Bartleby’s inaction, attempts to 
“reason” with Bartleby, and asks Bartleby to “be a little reasonable” (Melville 20). Indeed, 
for a refusal to be “reasonable” we must show that we act in concert with shared values, 
even as it may not obvious that we are doing so. In the case of Bartleby the Scrivener, 
“reasons” demand an allegiance to authority. “Reasons” must explain how our actions 
continue in the service of authority, and thus maintain the power-system, even if they do 
not superficially seem to do so. Of course, it is this very allegiance that Bartleby utterly 
lacks, and this very system that Bartleby effectively, albeit briefly obliterates. That the 
attorney continues to make requests of Bartleby even while he claims to be resigned to 
Bartleby’s inactivity proves that the attorney is very slow to realize that Bartleby has no 
intention of serving or appeasing. Bartleby effectively takes each utterance that precedes his 
phrase “I would prefer not to”, and strips it down to the matter of preference to serve 
implied by verbal supplication. Bartleby confronts the attorney’s underlying presumption 
that Bartleby wishes to serve, and responds only this aspect of each request. For this 
reason, Bartleby’s preference not to has no sufficient rebuttal; it acts absolutely.  
The attorney’s presumption that Bartleby prefers to serve is also, at base, a 
presumption that Bartleby prefers anything, prefers at all. But Bartleby does not prefer, and 
this becomes more and more clear in the course of the story as Bartleby increasingly 
embodies “non-preference”. Indeed, by the end, Bartleby does not prefer eating to not 
eating, or not eating to eating. He does not prefer life to death or death to life. Bartleby 
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does not choose one over the other. He does not even fulfill the prerequisite of choice: 
categorization. Bartleby discerns no categories. This is evident also with respect to “reason”, 
which speaks not only to shared values, as I previously described, but also to our cognitive 
abilities to string along successive thoughts, to be logical, to define, to classify and 
categorize. Herein lies Bartleby’s true revelation—he rejects categorization. 
As another point of contention, I do not think that Bartleby’s mission is innately 
solitary, as Hardt and Negri suggest. On the contrary, Bartleby affects those around him 
even against their will. Bartleby’s word prefer is called a “queer word” and at first, Bartleby 
is the only one to use it. Slowly, however, the entire office seems to catch the contagion. 
Turkey uses it – “yesterday I was thinking about Bartleby here, and I think that if he would 
but prefer to take a quart of good ale every day…”, and “Oh, certainly, sir, if you prefer that 
I should” (Melville 20-21). Nippers also uses the word when asking the attorney whether 
he “would prefer to have a certain paper copied on blue paper or white” (Melville 21). The 
attorney tells us that neither copyist in “the least roguishly accent the word prefer. It was 
plain that it involuntarily rolled from [their tongues]” (Melville 21). The attorney also admits 
to using it – “Somehow, of late I had got into the way of involuntarily using this word 
‘prefer’ upon all sorts of not exactly suitable occasions. And I trembled to think that my 
contact with the scrivener had already and seriously affected me in a mental way” (Melville 
20). Though the others “prefer” to do things (unlike Bartleby who prefers not to,) the 
sheer transmission of the “queer” word is powerfully foreboding for the attorney, who 
rightly wonders, “What further and deeper aberration might it not yet produce?” (Melville 
20). The attorney nervously senses that this “queer word” is only the beginning of a new 
way of being. 
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If Bartleby’s plight is to be solitary it is because those around him desert him. When 
the attorney becomes “aware that all through the circle of my professional acquaintance, a 
whisper of wonder was running round, having reference to the strange creature I kept at 
my office” the attorney begins to fear that Bartleby will tarnish his reputation (Melville 28). 
The attorney finally decides to move his office to a new location. As a further betrayal, 
when the new occupant of the attorney’s office has Bartleby removed from the premises, 
the attorney goes to help with the removal. In a sense, the attorney escorts Bartleby to his 
death. 
Even if Bartleby had not been betrayed by the attorney, but had endured as a 
sacred fixture in the attorney’s office, Hardt and Negri are correct in indicating that certain 
revolutionary instances do call for the overt formation of a new society. Nonetheless, there 
is also a value to the slow, eroding subversion of Bartleby in its potential for a brief utter 
freedom and the provisional creation of a society of equals. As a subversive figure, Bartleby 
is uninterested in imagining new (hegemonic) norms, or a new authority. He focuses 
instead on destabilizing the initial center such that it gives way to a temporary breath of 
nothingness, a brief collapse.  
 
Deleuze; The Orig inal Man 
Deleuze’s analysis of Bartleby also portrays him as an agent of social change and 
gives us a glimpse of a new society that Hardt and Negri failed to see. Deleuze sees the 
attorney and Bartleby relating within a paternalistic society, that is to say, a society of 
unequals. However, Bartleby has the potential to inaugurate a new society of “brothers”, 
equals. 
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Deleuze speaks of the “paternal function” to indicate a state of unequal power 
relations, in which the more powerful party is purportedly intellectually and otherwise 
superior to the less powerful parties, and therefore also responsible for the less powerful 
parties, as is a father for his son. As the boss in his own office, the attorney undoubtedly 
“fills the paternal function” for his clerks, Nipper and Turkey (Deleuze, 77). The attorney is 
Nipper’s and Turkey’s superior in occupation, as well as in temperament. While Turkey and 
Nippers only work efficiently for half the day and must be emotionally managed, the 
attorney is presumably efficient the whole day long, and paints himself as interminably  
“reasonable”, responsible, and at the very least, self-reflective. 
Deleuze theorizes that the attorney hires Bartleby “to make him his man” (75). If 
Bartleby is the son without a father, as Deleuze says he is, the attorney, it seems, is looking 
to adopt Bartleby (80). However, instead of the usual path, wherein the son grows to 
become the father, the reverse happens. Bartleby is at least briefly able to unseat the 
attorney from the paternal function and reclaim him as a brother. As Deleuze points out, 
Bartleby’s manner so unsettles the attorney that, despite the attorney’s insistence that he is 
reasonable and that Bartleby is the deranged one, the attorney is “disarmed, bewildered, 
stunned, thunderstruck, without response or reply” to Bartleby’s preference “not to.” Even 
the initial encounter with Bartleby—the attorney’s impulsive hiring of Bartleby after an 
interview lasting no more than a minute—is exceedingly odd. Throughout the rest of the 
story, “murder fantasies and declarations of love for Bartleby alternate in his soul” (Deleuze, 
75). Finally, the attorney’s frantic flight from his own office to escape Bartleby illustrates the 
depth of his disturbance. Of course, Bartleby is deranged in his inhumaness, and Deleuze 
urges us to see that the derangement of the attorney is really the merging of the attorney 
with Bartleby. This is because Bartleby’s effect on society is to establish “universal fraternity 
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that no longer passes through the father, but is built on the ruins of the paternal function” 
(Deleuze 78). When the attorney discovers Bartleby residing alone at the office during the 
weekend, the attorney thinks to himself, “The bond of a common humanity now drew me 
irresistibly to gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For both I and Bartleby were sons of Adam” 
(Melville 10). For some reason, perhaps because in Bartleby’s utter aloneness, the attorney 
senses his own, the attorney is able to recognize Bartleby’s equal humanity. Of course, the 
attorney acknowledges their equal humanity “under God,” a stipulation that is problematic 
in a secular world. I do not wish to suggest that all humanity is equal “under God,” rather I 
only want to point out that the attorney, for whatever reason, is briefly able to see a 
brother in Bartleby. Thus, by dethroning the attorney from his paternal function, Bartleby 
begins to erect the society of the “brothers”. As we know, he does not succeed in this task 
because the attorney ultimately betrays him. 
Deleuze further frames the relation between Bartleby and the attorney as one of 
primary nature to secondary nature. Bartleby is tied to primary nature, and Deleuze labels 
him an “Original”. Meanwhile Deleuze sees the attorney as the “guardian of the divine and 
human laws”, which govern secondary nature, and labels him the Prophet (Deleuze, 80). 
Primary nature is best understood as a queering function that operates by employing that 
which it troubles, in undermining itself. Deleuze writes that it is “original and oceanic, which 
knowing no Law, pursues its own irrational aim through [laws]” (79.) On the other hand, 
secondary nature is that of human laws, and may be understood as the hegemonic system 
at hand. It is the system of categorization that disperses against primary nature. Thus, 
though Bartleby as an Original does not follow the laws, he is inseparable from secondary 
nature and the world he inhabits. This is because the function of “Originals” is to expose 
“[the world’s] emptiness, the imperfection of its laws, the mediocrity of its particular 
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creatures… the world as a masquerade” (Deleuze 83). In other words, forever functioning 
as a critique, the Original depends on the world and its laws as both the objects and the 
tools of critique. Without them, the Original does not exist. The Prophets, then, are those 
in society who recognize the effect of Originals on the world and “the unspeakable 
confusion and trouble they cause in it” (Deleuze 83). Acting as the prophet, the attorney is 
able to “see” the primary nature within Bartleby. This is evident in the attorney’s 
descriptions of Bartleby, which use the exact terms of the characteristics of “Primary 
beings”. In fact, it is very likely that Deleuze’s description of Primary beings is inspired by the 
attorney’s endless descriptions of Bartleby: 
A powerful, solitary figure that exceeds an explicable form: it projects flamboyant 
traits of expression that mark the stubbornness of a thought without image, a 
question without response, an extreme and nonrational logic. Figures of life and 
knowledge, they know something inexpressible, live something unfathomable. They 
have nothing general about them, and are not particular… even the words they 
utter surpass the general laws of language (presuppositions) as well as the simple 
particularities of speech. Since they are like the vestiges or projections of a unique, 
original language, and bring all language to the limit of silence and music. There is 
nothing general or particular about Bartleby: he is an Original. (Deleuze 83) 
 
 
To return to an earlier point, Deleuze is interested in the attorney’s simultaneous 
identification with and betrayal of Bartleby. As I previously noted, the attorney feels a 
sincere connection to Bartleby, as well as empathy and love for him. However, the attorney 
betrays Bartleby, proving his allegiance to secondary nature, to order. The attorney deserts 
Bartleby in his office, and even helps the police drag Bartleby off to the Tombs. 
Nonetheless, the attorney continues to “cherish the innocent that [he has] condemned” 
(Deleuze 81). His final words on Bartleby are, “Ah, Bartleby! Ah, Humanity!” which, 
according to Deleuze, is not meant to indicate a connection, but rather a dilemma, a forced 
choice between the two; Bartleby or Humanity. The attorney must choose between the 
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“all-too-human law” and Bartleby (Deleuze 81). This points to the violent nature of all 
categories, which murder the potential for Bartleby’s universal fraternity.  
Deleuze concludes that our ultimate challenge is to somehow reconcile the Original 
with secondary humanity. Through the attorney’s betrayal of Bartleby in the name of order 
and paternal kindness, we must recognize that “there are no good fathers. There are only 
monstrous, devouring fathers, and petrified, fatherless sons” (Deleuze 84). Even though the 
attorney genuinely loves Bartleby, his paternal branding always already foretells the betrayal 
in favor of order. Deleuze concludes that, “if humanity can be saved, and the originals 
reconciled, it will only be through the dissolution or decomposition of the paternal 
function” (Deleuze 84). 
In summary, we might say that Bartleby destabilizes a hegemony based on paternal 
authority and inequality by stubbornly resisting the basic presupposition to servitude. His 
role as an Original is in some fashion revelatory, exposing the inadequacy of categories and 
bringing to light the potential for a fraternity of equals.  In those ways, Bartleby is an agent 
for profound social change. 
 
The Formula 
Deleuze and Blanchot both dissect the way Bartleby uses and misuses language in 
order to empty words of their referential meaning. For Deleuze, Bartleby’s idiosyncratic 
refrain, “I would prefer not to” unravels the web of language. He calls this strange utterance 
the formula. In this section, I will explain how Bartleby uses his formula to undermine 
language or the system from within.  
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Deleuze argues that language operates on the “logic of supposition.” Language is a 
system of references, in which words hold meaning because they refer to and can be 
explained by other words. He explains, 
A word always presupposes other words that can replace it, complete it, or form 
alternatives with it: it is on this condition that language is distributed in such a way as 
to designate things, states of things and actions, according to a set of objective 
explicit concerns… (73 emphasis mine) 
 
Each word within the web of language wields power and holds meaning insofar as it is 
presupposed by other words and is supported within the web by its relation to other 
words. However, Bartleby’s application of language in the phrase “I would prefer not to,” 
undermines “the presuppositions of language as a whole…the formula ‘disconnects’ words 
and things, words and actions, but also speech acts and words—it severs language from all 
reference…” (74) Bartleby’s use of language manages to cut words out of the referential 
system that give them meaning. In this way, Bartleby “[carves] out a kind of foreign language 
within language, to make the whole confront silence, make it topple into silence” (72). 
Deleuze points out how the formula has a “ravaging, devastating” effect on language, 
and “leaves nothing standing in its wake” (70). It is  
devastating because it eliminates the preferable just as mercilessly as any 
nonpreferred. It not only abolished the term it refers to, and that it rejects, but also 
abolishes the other term it seemed to preserve, and that becomes impossible. In 
fact, it renders them indistinct: it hollows out an ever expanding zone of 
indiscernibility or indetermination between some nonprefered activities and a 
preferably activity. All particularity, all reference is abolished. (71) 
 
In effect, the formula manages to break down the system of meaning on which language 
depends. All reference is abolished. Usually, to say that we prefer not to do some activity 
suggests at least a relative positive preference for some other activity. For example, if I say 
that I would prefer not to do my homework, it is appropriate to assume that, given a 
choice to either do my homework or make my bed, I would choose to make my bed. This 
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choice demonstrates a positive preference for making my bed, at least in relation to the 
nonprefered. However, Bartleby’s preference not to does not indicate a choice, as his 
insistence that he is “not particular” indicates the absence of a positive preference. There is 
no action that Bartleby wants to do, or even relatively prefers to do. Bartleby is not 
particular. He does not have specific positive preferences. Thus, when the attorney tells 
Bartleby to review papers in his office, Bartleby’s response “I would prefer not to” negates 
the possibility of any other possibly preferable activity. Deleuze writes,  
from the moment he says I would prefer not to (collate), he is no longer able to 
copy either… the effect of the formula-block is not only to impugn what Bartleby 
prefers not to do, but also to render what he was doing impossible, what he was 
supposed to prefer to continue doing. (70) 
 
 It is for this reason that Deleuze says that Bartleby’s formula eliminates the preferable along 
with the nonpreferred. In this sense, Bartleby truly does hollow out an ever-expanding zone 
of indetermination. His formula “[sweeps] up language in its entirety, sending it into flight, 
pushing it to its very limit in order to discover its Outside, silence or music” (Deleuze 72). 
 
B lanchot; ‘Pure’ Writ ing 
Blanchot describes another way that Bartleby plays with language in such a way as 
to erase all meaning: writing. Blanchot points out that Bartleby writes entirely passively. He 
in no way engages with the material. Bartleby simply copies words “silently, palely, 
mechanically” (Melville 7). Nonetheless, copying is seemingly all that he does. “As if long 
famishing for something to copy, he seemed to gorge himself on my documents. There was 
no pause for digestion. He ran a day and night line, copying by sun-light and by candle-light” 
(Melville 7). The attorney also observes that Bartleby never even leaves the office. His 
existence is devoted entirely to copying, with no interest in the content of what he writes 
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even to check over his work. Because Bartleby prefers not to review his copying, or any 
other office task for that matter, the attorney permanently excuses Bartleby from any other 
task but copying. For Blanchot, this work constitutes “‘pure’ writing, which can only be that 
of a copyist (rewriting)” (145). It is pure writing because the words that Bartleby copies 
have no meaning for him. Thus Bartleby does not even think as he copies. He writes words 
to reproduce their shape, not their meaning. In this way, the words on the page become 
empty signifiers, merely shapes to fill the space. Just as Bartleby speaks his formula to the 
effect of the dissolution of language, his manner of pure writing empties the written word 
of its meaning along with the spoken word.  
In a world in which, “he who criticizes or thrusts the game away, has already 
entered into the game,” the only way to slip through the cracks and escape the ‘game’ is to 
fail (Blanchot, 10). Pure writing, which methodically rubs the meaning out of words, can be 
seen as a failure to harness the power of words. For Blanchot, such failure is the only way 
to "halt the system, leaving it idle, delivered to the seriousness of irony" (47). The ensuing 
and idle silence signifies that the system has stopped. With the grind of gears now quiet, 
language is temporarily queered. 
 
Conclus ion 
Bartleby invites us to regard practices as potentially subversive, which do not refuse 
the system, or declare outright rebellion. He does so through passive resistance 
(Melville). His resistance is absolute (Hardt and Negri), resting on his total indifference to 
authority, his detachment from the world and his nonpart icular ity (Deleuze) or lack of 
positive preferences.  
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The key to Bartleby’s queer subversion is his nonparticularity. Bartleby’s total 
nonparticularity excludes the potential for any preferred action as soon as the attorney 
suggests anything to Bartleby. In this way, words are cut off from the system of language, 
sucked dry of their power. Thus, Bartleby undermines the spoken word. In a parallel 
fashion, Bartleby’s mindless, mechanical copying strips the written word of any meaning. 
In resisting the paternal function, Bartleby “throws a livid white light on his 
surroundings,” making visible the categorical hierarchy that silently and insidiously rules us 
(Deleuze 83). Furthermore, at base, Bartleby’s lack of preference, his failure to choose 
reveals his utter indifference to classification. These two characteristics, his resistance to the 
paternal function and his absolute lack of preference make Bartleby a queer figure—one 
who troubles the “natural” and categories in general.  
Finally, the attorney, too, plays a critical role. He is at once the father who must be 
destroyed, the prophet who witnesses this destruction by the Original, and the newly 
reclaimed brother who is pulled into Bartleby’s aura. His relationship with Bartleby 
illuminates the effect of the Original on others, and the path towards a radically equal 
society.
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In the last chapter, I talked about Bartleby as queering agent for social change. 
Because of Bartleby’s resistance to preference, choice, and categories, and his consequent 
revelation of the mediocrity of those categories, Deleuze labels him an Original. In this 
chapter I present the gender binary as another hegemonic system of categories that may 
be troubled by an Original. 
 Gender in all its forms is a social construct, a culturally and historically specific 
language we learn to speak and to understand. Just as Bartleby disrupts the spoken and 
written word in his realm, visibly genderqueer people disrupt the language of gender. They 
are Originals to the gender binary. In this chapter I will explain how gender operates as a 
social construct, and then go on to discuss the theoretical connections between Bartleby’s 
passive resistance and the subversive potential of visibly genderqueer people. 
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Men and Women 
Before grappling with theoretic understandings of gender, I want briefly to explore 
what gender means in common parlance. To do so, I begin with two basic questions about 
gender: What is a “man”? What is a “woman”?  
The most basic understanding roots itself in biology; a “man” is someone who has a 
penis and a “woman” is someone who has a vagina. Of course, sexist and homophobic 
accusations that abound for young boys---“why are you crying? You’re such a girl” or “why 
are you playing with dolls? Are you gay?” as well as stereotypes about female feminists 
being “hairy, ugly and manly” make it clear that there is more to the common 
understanding of gender than simply biology. Though we may think biology is the key 
determinant, social aspects have an even larger role in what gender means in the millions of 
day-to-day interactions.  
During a discussion on rape culture that I led for first years at Pomona, we drew 
out social aspects of gender through the lens of gender stereotypes. On the board I drew a 
circle labeled “woman” and a circle labeled “man”. Then students filled each circle with 
adjectives about “men” and “women”. By the end, the circle labeled “man” was filled with 
words like—strong, tough, rational, do not cry, logical, athletic, stoic, sloppy, cannot cook, 
always want sex, attracted to women, and likes videogames, cars and beer. The circle 
labeled “woman” was filled with words like—weak, emotional, prude/slut, attracted to men, 
nurturing, caring, irrational, passive, whiney, bitchy, likes shopping, babies and gossip. 
Though many of us could immediately identify someone who did not perfectly fit 
the adjectives or stereotypes about their gender listed above, we by and large remained 
unwilling to question the innateness of gender. Instead, we reformed our definitions to 
include the misfits. Maybe women can be sporty too, and sure, men can talk about their 
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feelings. “To stabilize the binary, we shift the boundaries of meaning and re-erect them” 
(Wilchins, QTGT 36). Yet with such an unstable definition, inevitably gender becomes 
suspect. In the following section, I reveal the fragility of the gender binary in order to 
dismantle it.  
 Because this chapter is intended to trouble the normative categories of “men” and 
“women” I have provided below a brief lexicon of terms that I will use in place of those 
terms. While not perfect, the alterative lexicon at least begins the project of denaturalizing 
“men” and “women”. Later in the chapter I will provide terminology for people who do 
not fit into any of these categories. 
 
Female-ass igned people - people who were assigned a gender identity of “girl” at 
birth. 
Male-ass igned people - people who were assigned a gender identity of “boy” at birth. 
Feminine-identi f ied people - people who identify as primarily feminine gender or as 
“women”. 
Mascul ine-identi f ied people - people who identify as primarily masculine gender or as 
“men”. 
 
Gender: Rules and Regulat ions 
The Myth of the Gender Binary 
The common language of gender speaks in one of two ways: either gender is 
masculine or it is feminine (IYGS 27). It is the most basic and fundamental way that we 
understand ourselves socially. From the very first moment that we are recognized in 
society, we are gendered. “It’s a boy!” the obstetrician declares. This gendering continues 
for the entirety of our lives in the clothes that we wear, the bathrooms we use, how we 
interact socially and the gender boxes we check on forms (IYGS 26). Though we commonly 
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think of gender as something we are, or perhaps something we have, gender theorist Judith 
Butler says that it is instead something we do. Furthermore, she writes, “there is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 
very ‘expressions’ of gender that are said to be its results” (GT 34). Such expressions are 
the length of our head hair, the pitch of our voice, and countless other signals that we may 
not even be conscious of employing. To be clear, none of these gendered acts, argues 
Butler, is an expression of an innate self or an innately gendered self.  
The concept of an innate self presupposes a subject that precedes the ways that we 
exist socially. That is to say, it presupposes that there is an innate self that exists, and we 
manifest our innate selves through what we say, what we do, our personalities and habits 
etcetera (Sullivan 89). In this view, our innate selves initiate and produce these actions, and 
therefore, also precede them. Butler argues against this paradigm. She says that there is no 
innate self that exists prior to our being-in-the-world. Instead, “the ‘doer’ is variably 
constructed in and through the deed” (GT 194). Stated differently, our identity is formed 
during and because of what we say, what we do, our personalities and habits etc. 
Our existence as gendered individuals is formed in and through various gendered 
acts. Like words, gendered acts communicate a culturally and historically established 
meaning, which is either masculine/male or feminine/female. In language, words hold 
meaning in so far as they relate to other words and have been used before to indicate 
specific meanings. Similarly, a gendered act, such as wearing a dress in 2010 in the United 
States, is considered feminine, or means feminine/“woman” only insofar as it has meant 
feminine/“woman” in the past. Indeed, dresses communicate femininity because in the 
recent history of the United States, dresses have been worn most often by feminine-
identified people. Nonetheless, we could just as soon conclude that dresses are most often 
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worn by feminine-identified people largely because of the feminine coding of dresses. In 
fact, this cyclical question of “which came first, the feminine coding of dresses, or the 
wearing of dresses by feminine-identified people?” works to obscure the process by which 
the dress becomes gendered, to the effect that dresses are seen as innately feminine. Yet, 
the culturally and historically specific meanings tied to gendered acts prove that there is 
nothing inherent or immutable about gender and the “doings” of gender. For example, in 
the U.S., before the late 1900s, most women did not wear pants regularly because pants 
were considered men’s clothing. Today, many women wear pants everyday, and pants are 
no longer seen as only masculine.  
Butler calls the formation of the subject in and through gendered acts the 
performative effect of such acts (GT 34). In doing these acts, we become gendered subjects. 
The prototypical example of a performative speech act is when a priest at a wedding 
announces, “I now pronounce you man and wife”. In such a case, the couple becomes 
“man and wife”, a married couple as and because the priest declares them to be. The 
statement “it’s a boy!” or “it’s a girl!” is similarly performative in defining our genders. Before 
we can even speak for ourselves, others dress us in the “appropriately” gendered clothing, 
and begin to encourage us towards certain gendered behaviors. Indeed, that this 
proclamation is often our primary interpellation into the world underscores the fact that 
the most basic way that we humans recognize one another socially is through gender.  
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The Gender Scale—An Attempt to Deconstruct Gender 
The Center for Gender Sanity’s Diagram of Sex and Gender (Walworth and Kammerer) 
 
Since the late 18th century, the idea has prevailed that our genitalia (sex) correlates 
directly to our gendered social role (gender expression and gender identity) and also to 
what gendered people we want to have sex with (orientation) (Bing and Bergvall 500.) The 
current paradigm of gender taught by mainstream gay and lesbian organizations like the 
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), shown above, is an attempt to 
denaturalize these connections between body, social role and desire by presenting them as 
discrete matters (Adams). This diagram also takes a step towards deconstructing the social 
aspects of gender by distinguishing between gender identity and gender expression. Loosely 
stated gender identity is what we feel like and the label that we put to that feeling. Gender 
expression is accomplished through the gendered symbols that we use to express 
ourselves, such as clothing, grooming practices, body language and more. As helpful as this 
framework is for beginning to pick apart the workings and masquerades of gender, it is very 
simplistic. The idea that we could occupy one point along the scale, that we are always 
BIOLOGICAL SEX 
(anatomy, chromosomes, hormones) 
male ------------------------------------- intersex --------------------------------- female 
 
GENDER IDENTITY 
(psychological sense of self) 
man -------------------------------- genderqueer/bigender ------------------------ woman 
 
GENDER EXPRESSION 
(communication of gender) 
masculine ------------------------------ androgynous ----------------------------- feminine 
 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
(romantic/erotic response) 
attracted to women ------------------ bisexual/asexual --------------------- attracted to men 
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conscious of our gendered self in exactly the same way in all situations, is untrue for many 
people (Bornstein 52). Similarly, the concept of a unified gender expression denies the 
multiplicity of acts that comprise our gender expression, and consequently the tenuousness 
and instability of our gender presentation. In reality, we all make gendered movements each 
moment that support and contradict the gender story that we tell about ourselves. A 
better way to think about gender would be to regard gender identity as an act, a piece of 
gendered expression. The sum total of all such gender expression is the same as what we 
simply call gender. Kate Bornstein also argues against this compartmentalizing of gender in 
biological sex, identity, and expression as such “typing” is really a tool of the system. She 
writes, “gender becomes typed in order to hold together the boundaries of a group” (116). 
By calling each of these “types” by the same name—gender—we recognize that they are 
each a word from a common language (ibid). This model of thinking about gender, as 
opposed to the paradigm featured at the beginning of this section, allows us fully to 
appreciate how piecemeal our gender really is.  Furthermore, it gives us the potential to 
pull at the occasional loose threads and discontinuities and thereby unravel the fabric of 
gender. 
The other pitfall of the previous paradigm is that it places these concepts on a scale, 
anchored by male and female. While it is intended to show that there is no hard and fast 
binary, it nonetheless keeps the binary intact by assuming that we can only move between 
male and female (Bornstein 115). To avoid being anchored by the binary, Bornstein 
proposes that we think of and articulate our gender through colors that may or may not be 
clearly related to any other color. 
On that note, imagine for a moment that, instead plotting our gender along the 
scales featured above, our genders were plot in the diagram below.  The faint color of the 
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borders of the square is intended to imply unboundedness. The point of this diagram is to 
portray two dimensions, rather than the one-dimensional spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
How does this model relate to the binary that we use now? Imagine that the red 
dots represent an “ideal male” gender, and an “ideal female” gender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The red dots may seem arbitrary in the above diagram, and, indeed, they are. 
However, by treating the red dots as the “norm”, they become the most recognizable 
genders, and the lens though which we recognize and understand all other genders. To be 
clear, the spectrum results when we collapse our multidimensional understanding of gender 
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into a one dimensional line, and require everyone to understand their gender in relation to 
the end points of the line, in this case, “male” and “female”. 
 
 
The unbounded rectangular gender-diagram that I initially proposed is by no means 
the only way of conceptualizing gender. We could just as easily have used a cube, a sphere, 
or added further dimensions (Bornstein 116). Indeed, we may want to think of our genders 
as multidirectional, multidimensional and constantly in motion, like electrons that move so 
quickly, we never really know where they are. As Butler says, “gender is a complexity 
whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given juncture in time” 
(GT 22). 
 
Sex  
Just as we saw on the Gender Scale, biological sex is intimately related to our 
discussion and understanding of gender. Though some people make no distinction between 
the two, feminists have historically differentiated between sex and gender so as to make 
the claim that “biology is not destiny.” This differentiation has helped feminists to illuminate 
and refute the widespread assumption that gender comes from sex. This assumption holds 
that the social and behavioral aspects of gender, such as gender roles and identities are in 
some way related to and even derive from biological sex. By saying that “biology is not 
destiny,” feminists contended that simply being “female” did not necessarily mean that one 
would be delicate, weak, nurturing, emotional, or any of the other gender stereotypes 
about “women”. Yet many of those feminists did not intend to challenge the assumption 
that bodies were “naturally” sexed either feminine or masculine or the assumption that a 
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person who is “naturally” sexed feminine is a woman. In other words, such feminists 
thought that having a vagina did not impede you from being a high-powered 
businesswoman, but it did impede you from being a man. So, as feminists were contesting 
what social roles were feminine and masculine, many continued to assume that bodies 
were inherently masculine or feminine and that it was this inherent genderedness or sexing 
of the body that led us to create gendered social roles. 
I suggest, as Butler does, that it is in fact the other way around. She writes, “if the 
immutable character of sex is contested,” and I will later argue that it is, “perhaps this 
construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed perhaps it was always 
already gender...” (GT 9). Furthermore, she writes, that the “production of sex as the 
prediscursive ought to be understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultural construction 
designated by gender” (GT 11). In other words, gendered thinking is what makes sex 
appear as though it were neutral and natural, outside of culture, history, and discourse. This 
leads her to the point that “sex itself is a gendered category” (GT 10). Kate Bornstein, a 
transgender activist, agrees, calling a “type” of gender-- another way that our bodies may 
be coded and interpreted as masculine or feminine (Bornstein 116). Even as more liberal 
views of gender accept that “gender” is interpretable, socially constructed and mutable, 
liberal acceptance does not extend to “sex.” Instead, the separation of “sex” and “gender” 
allows people to continue to discuss “sex” as a concrete, historically and geographically 
universal binary of male or female. Furthermore, because “sex” has historically been used 
to ground the social roles of gender in something physical, any project endeavoring to 
destabilize gender must also destabilize sex. 
 Sex refers to the biological characteristics that are said to differentiate male from 
female. Though we often use the word as if there were a clear cut sex for every person, 
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the biology that we use to determine “sex” is actually comprised of multiple, sometimes 
“conflicting” factors: sex chromosomes, secondary sex characteristics, gonads, sex 
hormones, internal reproductive structures, and external genitalia (ISNA). A body type that 
combines or mixes the so-called “standard male” and “standard female” types is called 
intersex or is said to have a disorder of sex development (DSD) (ISNA). A report put out 
by the Intersex Society of America (ISNA) gives the following examples of intersex 
conditions: “a girl may be born with a noticeably large clitoris, or lacking a vaginal opening, 
or a boy may be born with a notably small penis, or with a scrotum that is divided so that it 
has formed more like labia.” Some people with DSD look typically male or typically female 
on the outside, but have some internal organs that do not “match.” Finally, there are 70 
known irregularities involving sex chromosomes and some do not result in any signs of 
genital “abnormality” (ISNA). Some of the most common forms of DSD are Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, Klinefelter's Syndrome, Swyer 
Syndrome, Persistent Mullerian Duct Syndrome, 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, and Turner's 
Syndrome. Furthermore, the ISNA writes that,  
Though we speak of intersex as an inborn condition, intersex anatomy doesn’t 
always show up at birth. Sometimes a person isn’t found to have intersex anatomy 
until she or he reaches the age of puberty, or finds himself an infertile adult, or dies 
of old age and is autopsied. Some people live and die with intersex anatomy without 
anyone (including themselves) ever knowing. 
 
Because our society only understands masculine or feminine sexes, intersex babies 
constitute a natural impossibility to the way we understand sex. Their bodies are 
unintelligible to us, and so we regard them as a deformed, disordered and sick. They are a 
mistake. We assume that despite “Nature’s slip-up”, the child must have a masculine or 
feminine sex “underneath.” For this reason, much of the discussion around intersex babies 
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focuses on discovering their “true” sex. The possibility that the child’s “true” sex is intersex 
simply does not exist (Wilchins, QTGT 75). 
When DSD is found at birth, physicians will sometimes perform “corrective” 
surgery on the intersex baby in order to make the genitals look more like typical “male” or 
“female” genitals. These surgeries are not always necessary to the survival or wellbeing of 
the child, and in fact, they can result in physical harm such as scarring, chronic pain, chronic 
irritation, reduction of sexual sensation, and psychological harm (ISNA). Many activists for 
intersex rights see these surgeries as an example of violent punishment for the failure to 
conform to traditional notions of masculine and feminine sex (ISNA). Such nonconformity 
challenges our notion of sex, and clearly results in much societal anxiety (Wilchins, QTGT 
78). 
Yet, the difference between a clitoris and a penis is more subjective that we might 
assume. According to the ISNA, there is no consensus among doctors for when exactly a 
clitoris is too large to be a clitoris, or a penis is too small to be a penis. Nonetheless, for the 
most part, if it is smaller than 3/8 of an inch, it is a clitoris, and if it is larger than an inch it is 
a penis. If it is somewhere between 3/8 of an inch and one inch, it is considered intersex 
(Wilchins, QTGT 80). To comprehend fully how arbitrary this boundary is, I will borrow a 
thought experiment from Wilchins: imagine that the penis/clitoris needed to be smaller 
than 2/8 of an inch to be considered a clitoris. Suddenly, a number of women would 
become intersex. Conversely, imagine that a penis only had to be 7/8 of an inch to be 
considered a penis. Suddenly, a number of intersex people would find out that there was 
nothing “wrong” with them at all! They are male! (80). Genital variation with respect to size 
and shape is not something unique to the intersex population. Even the genitals of people 
who are safely considered male or female vary widely within their respective sexes.  
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Like gender, sex can be understood as another social construct that we interpret as 
either masculine or feminine. To maintain the illusion that it exists as a timeless universality, 
we patrol the border between the two, identifying a “true” sex for everyone and effectively 
erasing intersexuality (Wilchins, QTGT 75).  
 
Why do we subscr ibe to gender? 
Gender is one of the primary ways that we relate to one another. Part of the 
reason why individuals today choose to claim a normative (“man” or “woman”) gender 
identity is because institutions such as laws, the government, and even public facilities 
require it of us. Every time we deal with birth certificates, bathrooms, prisons, college 
applications, immigration laws, passports, and marriage laws, we are managed through our 
gender (Wilchins, IYGS 26). This type of gender regulation is top-down, and nearly forced 
upon us. Nonetheless, individuals also claim gender identities because other people require 
it of us. This type of regulation from the bottom up, occurs through thousands of small 
everyday acts, microexchanges of meaning that  
stamp us with our gender, bind us to it and require us to answer to it and interact 
with other people…Thus not only does language restrain us as individuals, but it is 
through the language of gender that we become who we are, that we come to 
recognize ourselves—and be recognized by others—as men and women and only 
as men and women. (Wilchins, IYGS 26) 
 
Wilchins speaks plainly here of the prevalence of gendering through the ways that we 
recognize and are recognized on a daily basis. Gender provides the platform for social 
interaction. There is another very obvious reason why we subscribe to gender— there are 
severe consequences for individuals who do not to conform. From stares and derogatory 
slurs to beatings, corrective surgeries, rapes and even murders, refusing or failing to 
conform is explicitly punished in our society. For example, while the average person has a 
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chance of 1 in 18,000 of being murdered, transgender people have a chance of 1 in 12 
(HRC). 
 
Gender Transgressors 
People who recognize that they do not fall into the clear cut categories of 
“man”/”male “or “woman”/”female” assigned to them at birth (“it’s a boy!”) may identify as 
transgender, genderqueer or other gender-variant identities such as cross-dressers, 
transvestites, transsexuals, drag kings and queens, genderfuck, two-spirits, intersexuals, and 
many others. Generally, and more recently, genderqueer is used as a blanket term for any 
gender-variant identified person who claims it. 
Riki Wilchins tells us that, “Genderqueers are people for whom some link in the 
feeling/expressing/being-perceived [of gender] fails” (IYGS 28). Thus, people may identify as 
genderqueer because they do not feel, look or act like a normative man or woman. The 
existence of such people potentially reveals the instability of normative gender categories, a 
binary that masquerades as universal and timeless. Furthermore, the existence of 
genderqueer people troubles the notion of an innate and coherent gender identity. 
However, in order for this subversive potential to be realized, genderqueer people 
must be recognized and recognizable. Such recognition could be through telling others that 
one is genderqueer. Some people who identify as genderqueer nonetheless appear to 
others as normatively gendered. As a result, these people usually “pass”. In other words, if 
those not informed of a person’s genderqueer status interpret the person’s gender identity 
as either a normative “man” or a normative “woman”, then the person is “passing”. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I will be concerned only with visibly gender-variant people, people 
who discernibly transgress gender norms, people who do not “pass” as normatively 
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gendered. This is because a genderqueer person who passes as normatively gendered does 
not necessarily require much effort from others, where as one who does not pass does. 
For example, for most people it feels routine to use female pronouns (she, her, hers) when 
talking about a person that presents and passes as a female-assigned person. It is, at least 
initially, much more challenging, and requires considerable attention to use female 
pronouns for a person who we know or suspect was a male-assigned person, even if we 
know the person is not masculine-identified. For this reason, I am less concerned with 
political identities within genderqueer, and more concerned with queerly gender identified 
people who either cannot, choose not to, or otherwise fail to pass. These people I will 
hereafter refer to as visibly genderqueer people. 
 
Bart leby in Drag 
Now that I have explained some of the fundamentals about gender theory and the 
way that gender operates, I am going to return to Bartleby. The rest of this chapter will 
focus on the theoretical connections between Bartleby’s subversive effect on language and 
authority, and the subversive potential that visibly genderqueer people have as Originals to 
the gender binary.  
 
The Formula and Pure Writ ing Revis i ted;  
Pass ive Resistance and Performativ ity in Gender Transgress ion 
Bartleby’s formula, “I would prefer not to” is the focal point of his subversive politics 
within language and lends itself well to understanding the subversive potential of visibly 
genderqueer people within gender. Through the formula, Bartleby applies performativity in 
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language as a tool against language itself. Furthermore, the passive quality of Bartleby’s 
resistance parallels that of visibly genderqueer people. 
As I described in Chapter One, Bartleby’s formula “I would prefer not to” carries 
with it the performative effect of disbanding language. Butler asserts that performatives 
generally “are statements that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and exercise a 
binding power” (BTM 225). Furthermore, she says that these words derive their power 
from “the invocation of convention” (BTM 225). If the intended effect of the invocation of 
convention is to “bind”, to build, to strengthen convention, than the disbanding effect of 
convention (language) through its very invocation, as in the case of Bartleby, is an inverted 
anomaly. In other words, if one uses a word the way it has traditionally been used, then the 
traditional meaning of the word, and its place within the larger web of words and meaning 
(language) ought to be reinforced. For Bartleby, the reverse occurs—his use of words, 
albeit drawing on their traditional meanings, results in the destruction of meaning and the 
words’ place within the web. Bartleby thus manages to turn the tools of language against 
itself.  
Performativity within gender works similarly, to bind the subject to a gender. 
Generally, gendered acts “congeal over time,” to create a unified gender expression of 
either male or female (Sullivan 82). For example, a female-assigned person wears a dress. 
Because mostly female-assigned people have worn dresses in the past, the invocation of 
convention, in this case, strengthens convention. The female-assigned person is considered 
feminine because she wears the dress, and the dress remains interlaced in the web of 
feminine signifiers. To this end, gender performativity bends towards strengthening 
convention (the binary). 
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The genderqueer identity is defined by its transgression of convention. In order to 
transgress convention, the genderqueer subject relies on convention and the performative 
effect of its invocation in order effectively to “misapply” it. For instance, a person who uses 
femininely gendered acts such as wearing a dress, having long hair and crossing the legs in 
order to “bind” them to femininity, relies on the past femininizing effect of such acts. When 
this same person grows a beard, has broad shoulders, or speaks with a low voice, the 
person is masculinized through those acts. The ensuing contradiction of masculine and 
feminine features in the person is only contradictory insofar as the features bind the subject 
to a gender. In the case of the broad shouldered, low voiced, long haired, dress-wearing 
person, the performative effect of each of these gendered acts works to disconnect the 
subject from a particular gender. How is this? “Intelligible genders are those which in some 
sense institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual 
practice and desire” (Butler, GT 23, emphasis mine). In other words, the language of gender, 
or the congealed effect of gender signifiers must result in either male or female, but not 
both, in order to be intelligible or legible within the language of gender.  
In a binary like gender, each term is dependent on the other for its definition as 
not-the-other, gaining its meaning through difference. The “female” is the not-“male”, and 
the “male” is the not-“female” (Wilchins, GTQT 36). However, the blend of genders 
present in our example speaks both masculine and feminine at the same time. According to 
Butler, “the cultural matrix through which gender has become intelligible requires that” this 
kind of gender not exist (GT 24). Yet, the “persistence and proliferation” of identities that 
exist despite the dictum against them “provide critical opportunities to expose the limits 
and regulatory aims” of the gender binary, and effectively show the binary to be false! (GT 
24). Like a true Bartlebian Original, visibly genderqueer people use the performative effect 
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of gendered phrases and signifiers to bring the whole of language to dissolution. Indeed, if 
the signifiers did not hold gendered meanings (masculine and feminine) then they would 
not be able to form the garbled speech that disrupts the binary.  
Alternatively, instead of hearing garbled speech, we could understand the 
dissolution of the gender binary as an instance of “pure writing” that results in the erasure 
of the meaning of each specific gender signifier. Just as Bartleby’s ceaseless and mindless 
copying allows the meaning to leak out of his words, visibly genderqueer people mix 
gender signals in a comparably “senseless” fashion. The words of gender no longer speak as 
they ought to, saying “man” or “woman”. Because of this, the language of gender fails. 
Consequently, the gendered words break from the power-system so that gendered acts no 
longer exert their gendered meaning. On a visibly genderqueer person, a skirt loses its 
feminine performativity. Like two gears grinding against themselves, the usual performativity 
of masculine signifiers grinds to a halt against that of feminine signifiers. The machine breaks 
down and the signifiers fall flat. Of course, this dissolution is ephemeral. As soon as a 
feminine-identified person walks by in another skirt, the feminine meaning is provisionally 
resurrected. Yet the vestiges of the dissolution remain, reminding us of the possibility to see 
beyond the binary. 
Why is this subversion unique to Originals, to self-proclaimed gender transgressives? 
It is not. No one follows all of their respective gender’s norms perfectly all the time. “Men” 
may cry, “Women” may like beer. These cross-gendered experiences also disprove the 
binary assumption that “men” are only masculine and “women” are only feminine. Yet 
because these people are not gender failures on the whole, because they continue to pass 
as normatively gendered in spite of these brief bungles, the myth of the binary remains 
intact. 
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As for the passive quality of Bartleby’s resistance encapsulated in his “preference 
not to”, we can see that the destabilizing promise of visibly genderqueer people is similarly 
not contingent on rebelliousness. It is difficult to generalize about visibly genderqueer 
people because, as a group, they stray from the normative genders in many different ways, 
and their reasons for doing so are equally varied. There are some gender nonconformists 
who identify as transgender for predominantly political reasons. These people are actively 
using their bodies to disprove the gender binary in the manner described previously. 
Nonetheless, it is certain that there exist visibly genderqueer people who do not conform 
to gender stereotypes because they cannot, or because they simply and steadfastly “prefer 
not to”. I do not mean to say that visibly genderqueer people must be apolitical or passively 
resisting gender norms in order to apply Bartlebian subversion, only that revolutionary 
intention to overthrow gender normativity or the gender hegemony is irrelevant to the 
visibly genderqueer person’s subversive potential. Stated differently, visibly genderqueer 
people have subversive potential whether or not they intend to. 
Nonetheless, purely political intentions may dampen the visibly genderqueer 
person’s social impact because their first plea to others would be presumably for political 
solidarity rather than simply for the space to be. This is exactly why the passive nature of 
Bartlebian resistance is important. For example, Bartleby does not take a political stance 
against work, a move that could potentially cause others who choose to work to feel 
judged by Bartleby. Similarly, most visibly genderqueer people do not demand that others 
throw aside their gender allegiances. Rather, Bartleby seems to ask only for a space to live. 
Because of this, the attorney is able to recognize, albeit briefly, their common humanity. 
The attorney is able to temporarily give himself over to Bartleby’s logic. In this same way, 
visibly genderqueer people who ask only for a space to live present a similarly passive 
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attack on gender, which is in many ways, more effective than any political campaign could 
ever be. 
 
Conclus ion 
By using bad grammar, so to speak, visibly genderqueer people make gender stand 
on its head. If gender works by appearing natural and inherent, a hard and fast binary, then 
visibly genderqueer people attack gender at its root: they show us that gender norms are 
anything but inherent or natural. In fact, because of the performative nature of gender, 
visibly genderqueer people can indeed performatively become genderqueer, occupying the 
space in between. The congealed effect of their gender either never settles or fully 
congeals. Thus, gender is effectively troubled. It no longer appears as something natural and 
coherent, but rather it is revealed to be the multiplicity of collaborating and contradictory 
acts that it is. When given the space that Bartleby briefly enjoyed, the gender performance 
of visibly genderqueer people causes the “attorneys,” those of us who identify as 
normatively gendered, to question the naturalness and coherence of our own gender 
identity. In this way, visibly genderqueer people act as the Originals to the gender binary.
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Loving 
outside simple lines; a guide  
to prophecy 
 
 
 
 
“Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, 
lacuna), which the Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and an access 
to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, 
mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but 
nomadic.”  
---Michel Foucault 
 
 
Lisa Duggan tells us in Making it Perfectly Queer that queer theory and queer lives, 
like those of Bartleby and visibly genderqueer people “carry with them the promise of new 
meanings, new ways of thinking and acting politically—a promise sometimes realized, 
sometimes not” (149, emphasis mine). In the last chapter, I explained the subversive theory 
behind the queer Originals—visibly genderqueer people, represented in Bartleby the 
Scrivener by the character of Bartleby.  In this chapter I will show how to make good on 
Duggan’s promise of a new queer politics and Deleuze’s society of equals. To do so, I will 
examine the role of the prophet, represented in Bartleby by the attorney. Drawing primarily 
from Loving Outside Simple Lines, an essay by Sonya Bolus, I will trace parallels between the 
narrator in Loving, and the attorney in Bartleby to show that the narrator does indeed act as 
Deleuze’s prophet. Furthermore, I identify the narrator in Loving as a positive example of 
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prophethood, in opposition to the attorney’s failed example. In examining the perspective 
of one successful prophet, and one failed prophet, I hope to outline the necessary context 
for the realization of the visibly genderqueer subversive potential, a motion in the direction 
of Bartleby’s society of equals.  
 
Sonya Bolus ;  Loving Outside Simple Lines 
In this story, the author writes about her relationship with her transgender lover, 
and how this relationship has transformed her understanding of her own gender. She 
begins by talking about making love to her partner and discusses her partner’s body 
dysphoria, or discontent. The narrator relates that together they imagine the lover has a 
“male” body -- “we both believe in this absolutely, and there is a shift from role play into 
another kind of reality” (Bolus 114). The narrator says that her lover lives “outside simple 
lines,” beyond the categories of the gender binary (114). “We are in uncharted territory,” 
the narrator tells us (116). 
 Eventually, the lover tells the narrator that he wants to have top-surgery. The 
narrator supports her lover but says that “inside me, a deep overwhelming panic begins to 
build” (114). An internal struggle ensues for the narrator, who feels her lesbian identity 
threatened by her lover’s desire to change his body and presumably his gender. Yet the 
narrator also understands that her lover’s deepest nature is transgender. He was never 
meant to be only ‘boy’ or only ‘girl’.  
In the months leading up to her lover’s top surgery, the narrator begins to feel 
excited about it. Finally, the day arrives and her lover goes in for surgery. In the months that 
follow, they “embark upon a journey filled with dramatic peaks and valleys” (118). The 
narrator concludes that she has also changed profoundly during this journey, and has found 
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a part of herself, which needed to emerge (119). In the final image the narrator leaves with 
us, she is gazing, protective and admiring, at her sleeping lover. 
 
Relat ionships of Responsibi l i ty  
Before engaging in an analysis of Loving and prophethood, I want to discuss what I 
think is the defining ingredient in becoming a prophet—responsibility. I think there are two 
relevant forms of responsibility: one that is born from the law, as in the case of the attorney 
to Bartleby; the other that is born from community, as in the case of the narrator to her 
transgender lover. 
Responsibility born from the law involves a hierarchical categorization of people, 
within which there is always a father-functioning figure. This makes it so that each party has 
a different responsibility to the other. The “father” is responsible for protecting and 
providing for the “son.” The “son” is responsible for obeying the “father.” This 
asymmetrical responsibility brings with it the institutionalized or legally sanctioned power 
imbalance characteristic of the paternal function. To erect the “society of brothers” over 
the ashes of the paternal function requires that the father relinquish institutionalized power. 
Some examples of this relationship include boss-employee (Bartleby), parent-child, adult 
child-elderly parent, teacher-student, caretaker-ward, physician-patient, etc.  
It is worth noting that the law functions also as a normalizing force that demands 
we act towards one another in categorically prescribed ways. For instance, parents or 
guardians are legally bound to house their children until the age of 18 under penalty of 
child abuse. This results in the norm of children living with their parents or guardians, and 
the consequent social and political invisibility of children who do not. 
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Responsibility born from community involves people joined together in pursuit of a 
mutual goal. These relationships of community-based responsibility are, taken at face value, 
relationships among equals. Some examples might include members of a sports team, 
soldiers in battle, fraternity brothers and sorority sisters, or even siblings. Although these 
relationships do not guarantee deep responsibility among all individuals, they provide the 
possibility. Another related relationship is that between lovers. Compassion and concern 
among lovers usually ensure that each individual’s struggle is shared by the lover. We can 
see this clearly in the romantic relationship in Loving. The narrator is distraught by her 
lover’s unhappiness because she cares about her lover’s wellbeing. Nonetheless, such 
compassion and concern are not unique to romantic relationships, and no doubt, occur 
most often in friendships. 
Institutionalized power differentials such as those characterizing relationships of 
responsibility through the law can also contaminate relationships of responsibility through 
community, shifting relationships among equals to a more paternalistic posture, once again 
ushering in the paternal function. This occurs when an individual within the community is 
seen as less human than others. Butler articulates this occurrence in Undoing Gender when 
she states, “the human is understood differently depending on its race, the legibility of that 
race, its morphology, the recognizability of that morphology, its sex, the perceptual 
verifiability of that sex…” (2). Certain groups of people are categorically deemed less 
human based on their race, gender, class etc. while other groups (specifically the 
heterosexual, white male) are recognized as human along those same lines. It is this 
paternal function, the resultant power disparity between the “human” and the “less-than-
human”, that operates in each of these relationships and provides the challenge that 
prophets must overcome in order to erect the society of equals. 
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Prophethood 
“Some days I feel very alone in the world… other days I feel like part of an ancient, unspoken 
tradition, as one who is particularly ‘wired’ to partner a transperson. I feel almost sacred” 
---Sonya Bolus 
 
In chapter one we saw that Deleuze’s prophet is one who has insight into the way 
Originals disrupt the order of the world. I now revisit Bartleby to draw out the context in 
which prophethood occurs. Many people experience fear and rage when they meet 
Originals, but usually only those who have an obligation to the Originals stop and reflect, in 
lieu of acting out physical or verbal violence. Those who reflect and can appreciate the 
deeper meaning of the Original’s contravention are the prophets. Thus, the prophet is a 
person of secondary nature, submissive to the laws (norms, categories) that the Original 
violates. Impelled by responsibility to the Original, the person realizes the deeper meaning 
of transgression and in that realization becomes a prophet. 
In Bartleby, Deleuze sees the attorney as the prophet. The attorney also acts as a 
guardian of secondary nature, the realm ruled by human laws. He is, after all, an attorney. 
As the guardian, the attorney has a stake in the fiction of secondary nature. Because the 
attorney accepts the concept of authority, what Deleuze calls the logic of presuppositions 
(“according to which an employer ‘expects’ to be obeyed…” [73]), the attorney himself 
gains authority. For example, Turkey and Nippers, characters of secondary nature who 
accept the notion of authority, are subservient to the attorney. Bartleby, on the other hand, 
eschews authority and does to obey the attorney. His flagrant resistance of laws and 
authority is not merely upsetting—the attorney’s world is shaken by it. But why are the 
other characters of secondary nature within the story comparatively unperturbed by 
Bartleby’s eccentricity? To be sure, they are disturbed, although most of them experience 
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fear and rage without understanding exactly why. Such people include Turkey ("I think I'll 
just step behind his screen, and black his eyes for him!" [Melville 13]) and Nippers ("I think I 
should kick him out of the office” [Melville 10]). 
Turkey and Nippers and the other characters of secondary nature are not 
responsible for the Original. I believe it is this responsibility that restrains the attorney from 
pursuing physical violence in response to his rage. His responsibility for the Original moves 
him to reflect on the situation. The other characters of secondary nature never come to 
understand the revelatory quality of Bartleby’s resistance. For example, the extent of 
Turkey’s and Nipper’s frustration with Bartleby is that the two are forced to check 
Bartleby’s paperwork because Bartleby will not do it himself. Turkey and Nippers do not 
adequately understand Bartleby’s irreverence for authority as such, and so Bartleby’s actions 
have much less bearing on their own lives. Similarly, the people who move into the 
attorney’s office are greatly disturbed by Bartleby’s refusal to leave the premises, but it is 
clear that they do not grasp the meaning of his refusals. In short, the attorney is the only 
prophet that Melville offers us. 
Shifting our attention back to Loving Outside Simple Lines by Sonya Bolus, it is, again, 
the narrator of the story who acts as a prophet, this time to the narrator’s transgender 
lover. In the context of Loving, secondary nature is defined by gender; thus the laws or 
categories at stake are those of the gender binary, and the lover constitutes an Original.  
It is clear from the story that at least initially, the narrator buys into the gender 
binary. She identifies as a lesbian, a concept firmly situated in gender—she is a woman who 
loves other women. From this, we know that the narrator is certainly tied to secondary 
nature, as Deleuze prescribes. We also know that the narrator understands how deeply 
her partner defies gender classification: the narrator of Loving tells us that her lover “was 
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transgendered before socialization tried to force you to choose ‘one or the other’” (115). 
The narrator sees that for her lover, the binary is a forced choice, not a natural one. The 
narrator also recognizes that her lover was not simply ‘born into the wrong body’ as the 
transgender narrative supposedly goes. Rather, her lover’s nature is deeply at odds with 
Deleuze’s secondary nature—the laws of gender, the binary, the mutually exclusive choice 
of ‘boy’ or ‘girl’ and all that comes with it. The prophet status of the narrator is most 
tellingly revealed in her admission that, “I have wanted to ‘figure you out,’ using an intellect 
fettered by narrow expectations, so implicit in my culture that even I have rarely, if ever, 
questioned them. You simply by existing, question all gender assumptions” (114, emphasis 
mine). Indeed, the narrator perceives that her lover’s existence exposes and leaves behind 
the binary logic of gender. She is a prophet. 
Because the narrator is invested in the very laws of gender that her transgender 
lover disrupts, the narrator, like Melville’s attorney, is enraged by the transgression of 
secondary nature. She says, “How dare you throw my universe into disarray! Just when I 
think I finally know myself! When I think I know you!” The narrator’s own sense of self is 
rocked by her lover’s changing gender (Bolus 116). Unlike the attorney, though, the 
narrator of Loving takes her meditation further into the realm of self-reflection, confronting 
the questions,  “Am I really a lesbian? What does this mean? How can I be a femme if you 
are a man?” (Bolus 116) Used here, the word femme refers to a particular queer lesbian 
gender. Unlike the attorney in Bartleby, the narrator of Loving does not ostensibly shy away 
from questions and challenges to her own identity. All the while, and true to Bartlebian 
subversion, her lover “never [steps] on or [dictates] my identity” (Bolus 116). Indeed, 
Bartleby never once asks the attorney to put down his quill and join ranks. Neither does 
Bartleby ask the attorney to consider the concept of an authority, a superior and an 
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inferior, equality or the attorney’s own role in it all. Rather, Bartleby quietly and meekly 
withdraws into passivity, asking only for a place to stay, to sit, to be. Likewise, the narrator’s 
lover never asks for more than the space to transition, the respect to be treated as he sees 
himself. But for the narrator, that is enough to inspire her to look  
…with courage at my self-definitions. I see how they are true to me. I also see how they 
sometimes limit me. Though they have often given me security and a means to self-
awareness I notice parts of myself I have suppressed: the attraction I once felt for men, the 
desire I feel now for other femmes, the need to examine my own othergenderedness. 
(Bolus, 117) 
 
Over time she comes to explore the “uncharted territory” of her own gender, an act that 
signals a companionship of equals, if not yet a society. Just as Deleuze predicts, it is in 
disposing of the paternal function, the hierarchy born from disenfranchising and 
pathologizing genderqueer people as sick and deranged, that the narrator and her lover 
show us the path toward the society of equals. 
 
Dissolv ing the Paternal Funct ion by Conf idence in Queer 
In a sense, this chapter is meant to be a road map for this exact task—the 
dissolution of the paternal function. Recall from chapter one that Deleuze tells us our 
ultimate challenge is to somehow reconcile the Original with secondary humanity. He 
presages, “if humanity can be saved, and the Originals reconciled, it will only be through the 
dissolution or decomposition of the paternal function” (84). 
In this section, we return to Bartleby and the attorney to understand why he, unlike 
the narrator of Loving, ultimately fails, betraying Bartleby and the dream of equality. If we 
retrace our steps back to the point at which the narrator of Loving and the attorney diverge 
paths, we recall that both engage in meditation on the Originals. Each contemplates the 
Originals’ personhood, life and interaction with the order of the world. That is, after all, 
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what makes them prophets. The crucial difference lies in their treatment of the paternal 
function. The narrator of Loving abandons it, while the attorney holds fast to it. 
Even before we address how to evolve beyond the paternal function, or what that 
would mean for our prophets, we should consider whether it is desirable or even possible 
to maintain relationships like that of the boss and employee while still abolishing the 
paternalism within them. For that matter, is not maintaining such relationships and their 
implicit power differentials directly in opposition to Bartleby’s goal of a society of equals? I 
think so. In the case of Bartleby, the paternal function operates vis-à-vis the attorney’s 
authority over Bartleby as his employee. Therefore, to quit the paternal function, the 
attorney must relinquish his authority over Bartleby. Melville provides us with one brief 
period in which the attorney does just that—he concedes, “I shall persecute you no more; 
you are harmless and noiseless as any of these old chairs” (Melville 27). Yet as soon as the 
attorney ceases to impose his will on Bartleby, is Bartleby really his employee anymore? On 
the one hand, absolutely not—by this time the attorney has verbally released Bartleby from 
employment several times. On the other, the attorney’s responsibility towards Bartleby 
persists, even after Bartleby stops copying, even after the attorney fires Bartleby, even after 
the attorney resolves to be at peace with Bartleby’s idleness. And it persists to the extent 
that the attorney feels it is his “mission in this world…to furnish you with office-room for 
such period as you may see fit to remain” (Melville 27). In fact, the attorney’s responsibility 
seems to endure even after the attorney moves to another part of town as the “stranger 
who proved to be a lawyer” reminds him—“you are responsible for the man you left 
there” (Melville 30). So Bartleby’s employment status rests in a rather uneasy limbo, 
because Bartleby effectually refuses to be an employee. Under this condition, the boss-
employee relationship must dissolve into similar indeterminacy. 
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With respect to gender, we can assume that a society of equals refers to equal 
humanity as per the earlier discussion of “humans” and “less-humans”. The paternal 
function here refers to the “human”’s power over the “less-human.” Its decomposition 
implies a leveling of humanity, and a consequent reorganizing of social power within 
relationships. The initial hierarchy of power within gender accords along the binary: “Men” 
within the binary are the most human, “women” within the binary are less human. Of 
course, people are never just their gender. Other factors, such as race and class, also 
intercede on the gendered relationship between two people, and must be negotiated in 
the reorganization of power. 
Nonetheless, just as the boss (the attorney) must find a way to relate to the non-
employee (Bartleby) outside the categories of boss and employee, so too must any gender 
normative (binary abiding) person find a way to relate to those who refuse the labels 
“man” or “woman” (genderqueer people) outside of the binary. This space is necessarily a 
queer space, the limbo-land of gender. Indeed, the decomposition of the paternal function 
demands a willingness to wander beyond-- the prophet must be open to exploring the 
dimensions of her own genderqueerness.  
Let us now consider why the paternal function persists within Bartleby. The attorney 
in Bartleby never fully meets Bartleby in the queer space beyond their professional 
relationship. The Sunday that the attorney finds Bartleby alone in the office, he finally 
experiences the “fraternal melancholy” which permits him to see Bartleby’s humanity and 
recognize Bartleby as an equal (Melville 17). But for the attorney, this realization proves 
fleeting. Almost immediately a “prudential feeling” steals over him as his concern resolves 
itself into pity, fear and repulsion (Melville 18). The prudential feeling echoes an earlier 
admission by the attorney that his own superior, “The late John Jacob Astor… had no 
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hesitation in pronouncing my first grand point to be prudence” (Melville 2). Thus, such a 
feeling denotes a revival of the paternal function: He decides that Bartleby is “the victim of 
innate and incurable disorder” (Melville 18). Consequently, the attorney wants to help 
Bartleby, but he does so in a way that does not respect Bartleby as an equal. Rather, he 
treats Bartleby as a sick person to be looked after. As Deleuze points out, “what was 
Bartleby asking for but a little confidence from the attorney, who instead responds to him 
with charity and philanthropy—all the masks of the paternal function?” (88).  
Confidence in Bartleby would have led the attorney down a separate path. For it is 
confidence—“in themselves, in the world, and in becoming”—confidence in Bartleby, that 
would have permitted Bartleby to heal the attorney (Deleuze 88). Confidence in becoming 
must outweigh the desire for knowing (which is always within the confines of hegemonic 
categories, distinctions and definitions) in order for the Originals queer transformation to 
take hold.  
In contrast, the narrator of Loving has confidence in her lover, which is the key to 
dissolving the paternal function. The narrator sees her lover as an equal and trusts him to 
know what is best for himself. Moreover, confidence in her lover gives her the courage to 
look at her own self-definitions and recognize her own “othergenderedness.” The narrator 
says, “Gradually I have learned not to try to understand you with my intellect but instead to 
trust my heart, so clear in its acceptance and love for you” (115). This is the essence of 
loving outside simple lines, loving without needing to know or categorize, loving with 
confidence in becoming. Perhaps the reason that confidence in another person undoes the 
paternal function is because we feel secure in relinquishing our paternalistic power over 
another person when we choose to trust the other. 
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It is important to understand that having confidence in queer, and the process of 
exploring one’s own queerness or othergenderedness will not always lead us definitively 
away from the binary. And though Bartleby’s society of equals does not require us to shed 
completely the “male” and “female” gender categories, it does requires us to make room 
for other new, queer kinds. Indeed, prophets need not emulate the Originals by taking up 
the identity “genderqueer,” if it does not fit. The process of gender exploration is, on its 
own, enough to complicate our categories and release us from their hegemonic hold. 
  
Extending Ins ights 
The importance of the insights described above increases if we can extrapolate the 
paradigm beyond gender. If gender is a language, then so are the many other ways that we 
code ourselves socially. Race, class, nationality, religion, and sexuality are all languages we 
speak, and identities we do. To queer any of those languages, as I have done in this thesis 
with gender, we need only to identify one who does not fit easily into one race or another, 
one class or another, one nationality or another. I propose that one potential Original for 
race could a mixed-race person, but I will leave it up to the reader to find the many others. 
 
Conclus ion 
In Loving Outside Simple Lines, the narrator and her lover play the roles of prophet 
and Original. I have tried to show that one becomes a prophet through relationships of 
responsibility. This is because taking responsibility forces us to engage in the struggles of 
those for whom we are responsible. In turn the engagement makes us more likely to 
seriously consider their problems, rather than reflexively reacting with violence.  
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As the prophet, one who interprets the revelatory effect of the Original, the 
narrator discerns the deeply transgender nature of her lover. She says her lover was 
transgender “before socialization tried to force you to choose ‘one or the other’” (Bolus 
115). The prophet wants us to understand that though her lover may be considered an 
FTM (female to male) trans person in common parlance, had he been assigned male at 
birth, he would still not have fit into the gender normative category of “man”. It is only in 
the act of transcending the boundaries of the two, in occupying the space outside (and not 
necessarily between) that the lover has some comfort. 
This profound understanding of the lover allows the narrator to ultimately trust him 
in the transformations that he deems necessary. Thus, the narrator has confidence in the 
queer, the Original, in her lover. She has confidence in a way that the attorney never had in 
Bartleby. Such confidence triggers the dissolution of the paternal function, and the leveling 
of humanities. Confidence in queer is the means to Bartleby’s society of equals. 
With respect to other categorizing hegemonies that I have mentioned briefly in this 
chapter, a similar ethic of confidence may be employed to queer those categories. Rather 
than criticizing others for their failure to conform to our expectations of what we may think 
is their proper group, let us gain insight and partnership in their boundary blurring. Let us be 
healed by it.
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Conclusion 
reconciliation, or 
attending to tensions 
 
 
 “Learn to think with pain” 
---Maurice Blanchot 
 
 
In real life, queer Originals like Bartleby who challenge the categories of our 
understanding are regarded with disdain, much like Bartleby himself. They are considered 
“sick”, “deranged”; there is something “wrong” with them. Deleuze offers a reverse 
perspective—perhaps it is our categories that are “wrong”, perhaps it is we who are “sick”. 
It is by this logic that Deleuze says, “Bartleby is not the patient, but the doctor of a sick 
America” (90). 
In this thesis I have argued that genderqueer people are a similar kind of doctor for 
those of us laboring under the gender binary. The usual script reads: the genderqueer 
person is sick and deranged. The gender normative person is healthy and sane, and 
therefore should determine what is best for the genderqueer person. The script I have 
proposed reads: those who let themselves be confined by the gender binary carry the 
wound, but may be healed by having confidence in the genderqueer person in the defiance 
of the binary. 
In the first chapter, I introduced Bartleby the scrivener as a model for resistance. His 
strange utterance “I would prefer not to” constitutes a resistance to serve and 
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simultaneously reveals the presumed naturalness of that which he declines--- service to an 
authority. His phrase raises the unsettling possibility of other ways of being. His rejection 
does not derive from a revolutionary impulse to refuse but rather a deep and absolute 
passivity comprised of “the restraint, the gentleness that cannot be called obstinate, and 
that outdoes obstinacy with those few words” (Blanchot 145). Furthermore, Bartleby’s 
unyielding use of his formula precludes all preferred alternatives to any requests by the 
attorney. Thus, the formula slices through the web of language, ravaging meaning with each 
word spoken and unspoken. In the same way, Bartleby’s incessant copying numbs the mind 
to meaning in the words. He copies to copy and nothing more. As Blanchot writes, 
“Language, perpetuating itself, keeps still” (145). Thus, in so many ways, Bartleby declines to 
serve, declines to choose, to discriminate, to categorize. He causes categories “to topple 
into silence,” to collapse in on themselves, releasing us into indeterminacy (Deleuze, 72). 
Bartleby is the passive activist--the failure who does not wish to rebel, who cannot help but 
to misuse language, or to use it badly. The activist, who, by failing, overturns order. 
In the second chapter, I introduced gender as another hegemonic system of 
categories to be negotiated by Originals. For the first half of the chapter I reviewed the 
nature of gender, showing that it is a language, socially constructed much like the others we 
speak. Judith Butler theorizes that gender is something we do, rather than something we are 
or something we have. It is the way we sit and inhabit space, the intonation at the end of 
our sentences, our treatment of body hair and so many more seemingly insignificant acts 
that color our day with gender. In fact, we become gendered during and from those 
gendered acts, and the combined effect of those acts. As a language, gender grammar 
demands that we speak only ever male or female, and never both, in order to make sense. 
 Conclusion 
 - 62 - 
The constructedness of gender extends also to our sex, which has traditionally 
been seen as the biological marker of gender. We consider sex to be outside of and 
preceding the socially constructed “gender”. Yet, Butler proposes that sex itself is “always 
already” gender (GT 9). Because we speak and listen for the words of gender, we are 
poised to “hear” gendered words from all bodies, words that are never “natural” or innate, 
but always interpreted, already scrutinized through the lens of gender.  
Given the ubiquity of gender signs and signifiers, it is not surprising that gender 
comprises one of the primary ways that we relate to one another. As a result, genderqueer 
people who do not abide by the rules of gender act as Originals, demonstrating, through 
their failure, their illegibility, the tenuousness of the gender binary. Their use of gender 
signifiers disrupts foundational ideas about gender—that we must be either male or female, 
but only one, and always that one. Much like Bartleby’s “pure” writing, and his preference 
“not to,” genderqueer people’s application of gendered language against itself allows them 
briefly to disband gendered language, and slip out of the binary. This is possible because of 
the performative effect of language and gender, which typically entails the drawing on the 
traditional meaning of a signifier (the invocation of convention), and also typically results in 
the strengthening of convention. In the case of Bartleby and genderqueer people, it results 
in the dissolution of convention. In this way, genderqueer people are able to use the laws 
of gender to trouble gender categories, revealing the true instability and constructedness of 
those categories. I concluded that the genderqueer Original is a figure with subversive 
potential, whose actualization hinges on the performance of the prophet. 
In the third chapter, I drew on Sonya Bolus’s short story Loving Outside Simple Lines 
to demonstrate the role of the prophet in realizing the subversive potential of the Original. 
As examples of prophets, I compare the narrator in Loving to the attorney and focus on 
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their responsibility to the Original. Relationships of responsibility derived from the law are 
operate by categorizing people and affirming their power differentials. One party generally  
has “paternal” authority and power over the other. Conversely, relationships of 
responsibility through community come from uniting in pursuit of shared goals. Though 
power within this relationship is more equally distributed, institutionalized power 
differentials may nonetheless arise due to classism, sexism, racism, etc. In both kinds of 
relationships of responsibility, it is this categorical power differential, and the associated 
paternal function that must be shed for the prophet to usher in the Original’s queer society 
of equals. 
Within Loving, the narrator and her lover share a relationship of responsibility 
through community. The institutionalized power differentials that creep into their 
relationship are twofold, but both gender related. In the first place, the narrator, to some 
extent, wishes to be dominated by her lover. As an aside, the narrator is femme, or the 
more feminine partner, while her lover is butch, the more masculine partner. This dynamic 
plays at least somewhat into traditional sexist stereotypes that equate masculinity with 
dominance. In the second place, the lover’s genderqueer status as a transgender person 
establishes him, in the eyes of society, as “sick”. In contrast, the gender identity of the 
narrator as a comparatively normatively gendered woman (one who is both female-bodied 
and feminine identified) elevates the status of the narrator to one who is “well”. Thus, the 
paternal function that the narrator gains as a product of being “well” while her lover is 
“sick” parallels that of the attorney. Though this does pose a challenge for the narrator, her 
confidence in her lover allows them to overcome it, a feat that the attorney fails to do. 
Consequently, the narrator’s deep trust in her lover leads her to a question her own 
relation to gender and the binary. This exploration leads her to a queer discovery of her 
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own “othergenderedness” and “transensuality.” Here, she enacts Deleuzes’s insight of 
healing by the Original. 
 
F ina l  Thoughts  
Throughout my thesis, I have suggested that healing by the Original can pave the 
way to Bartleby’s society of equals. Paradoxically, and perhaps hypocritically, I initially argue 
that the subversion enacted by Originals is ephemeral, while my later discussion of the 
healing that may come from queer subversion motions towards a new dispensation that 
presumably endures. I think it is not too much to say that Bartleby’s society of equals is a 
mirage, an impossible ideal. However, It is debatable whether or not a particular prophet’s 
new queer wisdom, and the companionship of two equals can be permanent. It seems 
more likely that our “all-too-human” pursuit to know, to name, and to categorize will 
supersede any advances we make. Secondary humanity will always be sick in new ways 
(Deleuze 81). Thus perhaps as “genderqueer” (which replaced “transgender” as an 
umbrella term for gender-variance) as a concept solidifies, it too will be eclipsed by yet 
another queerer, hazier term. Given this, we encounter a stalemate between a politics of 
remaining vigilant and critical, as are the Originals, and one that working towards a time 
when we no longer need to be critical. 
Looking back, let us return again to Deleuze’s question of how to reconcile the 
Original with secondary humanity. What does this question really ask? If Originals are those 
who call into question our categories, and secondary humanity refers to people who abide 
by those categories, what does this reconciliation even look like? Is it merely the unsatisfying 
acknowledgement that all the ways we try to “know”, to categorize, are false, flat, and self-
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defeating? If secondary humanity truly is always sick in new ways, how do we avoid a 
nihilism that prevents us from cultivating the will to be healed, even if it is only a provisional 
health? I do want to argue that, though the society of equals is not realizable, we should 
fight for it as if it is. At the very least, in doing so we may carve from the rock a space for 
ourselves. And though, as responsible doctors who work to heal humanity, we must spend 
our days among the sick, perhaps there is some brief respite to be found “in the intimacy of 
our nights,” where Blanchot tells us that Bartleby’s queer “preference not to” reigns freely 
(145). 
The final question I would pose is whether order can ever be liberating rather than 
oppressive, radically free rather than coercive and hegemonic. Bartleby’s activism does not 
put forth a new order, and therein lies its advantage. It allows for the perpetual questioning 
of all orders particular and general. It is an unsaying that with each utterance revolves in on 
itself, and must continue to speak to relive the breath of freedom. Perhaps reconciliation is, 
in the end, an aporia. Perhaps that is just the point.
Yes! 
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